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EMPLOYEE VOICE AND EMPLOYER CHOICE: A
STRUCTURED EXCEPTION TO SECTION 8(a)(2)
CLYDE W.

SUMMERS*

INTRODucrION

There is no need here to restate the reasons employees should
have a voice in the decisions which affect their working lives. Nor is
there need to revisit the voluminous literature detailing how employee
participation increases productive efficiency and quality, and how it
enhances democratic values and personal dignity. I leave that to my
fellow contributors and their industrious footnoting.
There are few in politics, personnel management or academia
who would openly argue that employees should have no voice in the
terms and conditions of their work. The debate is largely over how
much voice they should have, and in what decisions; though the underlying dispute is often whether the employees' right to voice is
matched by management's duty to listen.
Participation is often limited to the one-way channel of the "suggestion box" through which employees may speak but seldom receive
answers. Or participation may be through a two-way "communications" system in which messages are shuttled up and down the hierarchical chain with no dialogue or shared decisions. "Quality of work
life" programs with "quality circles," "production teams," and "employee involvement programs" may provide some voice in performance of tasks, daily work assignments, production goals and minor
shop floor problems. But these devices provide no voice in larger
matters of job training and promotion rights, health and safety, wage
payments and benefits, employment policies and job security.
The search for new forms of employee representation is driven by
an assumption that these forms of participation which have such limited substance are not adequate; that workers should have a collective
voice in all decisions, both small and large, which significantly affect
their working lives. At present, the only channel for participation is
through a majority union acting as exclusive representative in collective bargaining. But less than thirteen percent of all employees in the
*
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private sector are now represented by unions; eighty-seven percent
have no voice in substantial matters affecting their working lives.
The search is primarily for some meaningful form of employee
representation other than traditional collective bargaining which goes
beyond what the NLRB described in Electromation, Inc. as a "'communication device' to promote generally the interests of quality or efficiency." 1 The purpose here is to suggest one direction the search
2
might take.
I.

THE USEFULNESS OF FOREIGN EXPERIENCE

Not surprisingly, some of those searching for new forms or representation have looked to the labor relations systems of other countries, particularly our chief international competitors, Germany and
Japan. Professor Weiler, whose book Governing The Workplace has
energized the current discussion, has proposed establishing, by statutory mandate, "Employee Participation Committees," (EPC) built on
the model of the German works council. He has sketched out the
elements of such a committee's structure, responsibilities, resources
and finances following generally the outlines of the German Works
Constitution Act,3 but with modifications to fit the American situation. 4 Professors Freeman and Rogers would move in the same direction, but without a statutory mandate. They would encourage
employers to create Employee Participation Committees by tax
breaks and other government incentives, and allow less than a major5
ity of employees to trigger their formation.
Comparable efforts have not been made to build on the model of
the Japanese enterprise unions which, in practice, bear many similari1. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 997 n.28 (1992).
2. This is merely an elaboration of a suggestion floated in Clyde W. Summers, Industrial
Democracy: America's Unfulfilled Promise, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 29 (1979).
3. Betreibsverfassungsgesetz, Vom 15. Januar 1972 (officially translated by The Federal
Minister of Labour and Social Affairs in Co-determination in the FederalRepublic of Germany).

4. PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 282-95 (1990).
5. Richard B. Freeman & Joel Rogers, Who Speaks For Us? Employee Representationin a
Nonunion Labor Market, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: ALTERNATIVES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 13 (Bruce E. Kaufman & Morris M. Kleiner eds., 1993). Similar suggestions have been
made earlier. See R.J. Adams, The Unorganized: A Rising Force?, in JoBs AND LABOUR
PEACE-AN AGENDA FOR ACTION 40 (Lisa R. Cohen ed., McGill University Industrial Relations Centre 31st Annual Conference 1983); Roy J. Adams, Should Works Councils Be Used as
IndustrialRelations Policy? MONTHLY LAB. REV. July, 1985 at 25; DAVID M. BEATTY, PUTING
THE CHARTER To WORK: DESIGNING A CONSTITUTIONAL LABOUR CODE 144-55 (1987); Clyde

Summers, Past Premises, Present Failures, and Future Needs in Labor Legislation, 31 BUFF. L.
REV. 9, 28-30 (1982).
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ties to the German works council, but which are built on a statutory
base modeled on the Wagner Act.6 American employers, however,
have borrowed heavily from the Japanese in creating quality circles
7
and other work group structures. If not barred by section 8(a)(2),
employers would likely copy the Japanese consultation committees
and encourage the organization of enterprise unions to fend off or
supplant traditional American unions.
No responsible person seriously suggests that German works
councils or Japanese enterprise unions can be transplanted unchanged
to American soil. Modifications, some major, would need to be made.
Professor Weiler has flagged some of those necessary changes. Without detailing how it might be done, it is enough for my purposes here
to state that I believe that a works council system modeled on the
German system could be structurally superimposed on our collective
bargaining system. It could be done in a way which would provide a
form of representation to those not now represented by unions without undermining or weakening our present collective bargaining system, and perhaps substantially strengthening it. The obstacle is not
structural, but political. It could work if employers and unions were
willing to let it work. That, however, in my view, is a forbidding, if not
preclusive if.
Although we can not, or will not, mandate works councils, we can
learn from German and Japanese experience. The most important
and illuminating question to ask is why they seem to work so well.
That may give us some better understanding of what is required if we
are to develop new forms of effective representation for ourselves and
the difficulties we face if that is to be achieved.
German works councils and Japanese enterprise unions have several factors in common which underlie their effectiveness. First, they
are rooted in the workplace, focused exclusively on problems of the
enterprise.8 Membership in German works councils is, by law, limited
to the establishment;9 council members are employees in the workplace, elected by other employees in the workplace and accountable
only to those employees.10 Where an enterprise has several establishments, separate works councils may form a central works council, but
6. Taishiro Shirai, A Theory of Enterprise Unionism, in CONTEMPORARY INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN JAPAN 117, 120 (Taishiro Shirai ed., 1983).
7. Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988).
8. See generally Clyde W. Summers, Worker Participationin the U.S. and West Germany:
A Comparative Study from an American Perspective, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 367 (1980).
9. Works Constitution Act 1972, §§ 1, 5. (F.R.G.).
10. Id. § 8.
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the structure is confined to the enterprise." This focuses the works
council on the welfare of the enterprise and focuses the employer on
the welfare of its employees. This minimizes external influences; outsiders and outside influences do not intrude.
It is true that three-fourths of the works council members are
union members, often elected on a union slate. But once elected they
consider themselves responsible to their fellow employees and not to
the union. Frequently they refuse to follow union policy, even to the
extent of being disowned by the union and denied a place on the
union slate in the next election. They may then win reelection on an
independent slate. 12 Even though the works council asserts its independence, the union provides it technical assistance and advice when
asked, for the union, not the works council, is the suitor.
Japanese enterprise unions are similarly rooted in the workplace
13
or enterprise, for there is no parent national union as we know it.
The enterprise unions may be affiliated with a national confederation
which provides some coordination, particularly in bargaining for general annual increases in the shinto or "spring offensive."' 14 But the
enterprise union is essentially independent, and its officers and members consider it a part of the enterprise. Its purpose, in their view, is
to serve the enterprise as well as its members.
Second, employers in Germany and Japan generally accept, indeed support, the system of plant level representation. German employers accept that employees are entitled to collective representation
and a voice in decisions of the enterprise. They recognize that the
works council can help solve problems and find mutually acceptable
solutions. When such solutions are agreed upon, employers rely on
the works council to persuade employees to accept them and carry
them through. As a German employer said to me, "I could not run
the plant without the help of the works council." But employers also
recognize that works councils cannot serve these functions unless
there is genuine sharing of information and decision making.
It is worth noting that although German employers accept collective bargaining with unions at the national or sectional level, they refuse to recognize or deal with unions at the plant level and have
11. Id. § 47.
12. Summers, supra note 8, at 373.
13. See generally Shirai, supra note 6, at 117-44.
14. TiE JAPAN INSTITUTE OF LABOUR, JAPANESE
LABOR UNIONS AND LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SERIES

18-20 (1986).
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resisted establishment of union steward systems in the workplace. 15
They accept the works council because, "they are our people."
Japanese employers similarly accept enterprise unions and find
them useful, although they predominate only in the large enterprises,
16
and less than one-third of all workers are in enterprise unions.
Where they exist, they are not viewed as adversaries of management,
but as integral parts of the enterprise. This results, in part, from the
fact that the practice of internal promotion results in many of those in
management having once been officers of the unions in Japan. 17 Japanese employers, unlike German employers, are not confronted with
potential intrusion from "outside" unions, for there are no substantial
"outside" unions in Japan. But there is reason to believe that they
would be equally resistant to such unions at the plant level.
Underneath this acceptance of plant level representation is a
third and more subtle factor-a recognition that employees are not
just another factor in production, their labor to be purchased like supplies or energy. Instead, they are considered members of the enterprise and entitled to a voice in its decisions, with a share in the
enterprise because of their contribution to its production and profitability. This is the articulate premise of the German Works Constitution Act' 8 and the Codetermination Acts 19 providing for employee
representation on corporate boards, but it is reflected in other legal
rules and practices.
For example, German dismissal law proceeds from the premise
that an employee has a right in his or her job and can not be dismissed
without "social justification. ' 20 Although employers are not required
to retain unnecessary workers, an employee cannot be dismissed if
there is another job available in the enterprise which the employee
can perform; and the employer may be required to provide the employee training for that job.21 If a going enterprise is transferred, the
15. Summers, supra note 8, at 384.
16. THE JAPAN INSTITUTE OF LABOUR, supra note 14, at 11-14.
17. Shirai, supra note 6, at 139.
18. Supra note 3.
19. Montan-Mitbestimmungsgesetz, Vom 21. Mai 1951 (Codetermination in the Coal and
Steel Industry) (officially translated by The Federal Minister of Labour and Social Affairs in Codetermination in the Federal Republic of Germany); Mitbestimmungsgesetz, Vom 4. Mai 1976
(Co-determination Act) (officially translated by The Federal Minister of Social Affairs in Codetermination in the FederalRepublic of Germany).
20. Annegret Dose-Digenopoulos & Armin Holand, Dismissal of Employees in the Federal
Republic of Germany, 48 MOD. L. REv. 539, 542-44 (1985).
21. MANFRED WEISS, LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 85-86 (1987).
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employee's job rights are transferred with the enterprise and the successor assumes the obligation for continued employment with existing
seniority rights.2 2 In cases of mass dismissal or plant closure, the employer has an obligation to work out with the works council a comprehensive plan for helping employees make the change. This may
include staged timing of lay offs, transfers to other parts of the enterprise, job retraining, moving allowances, and severance pay. If full
agreement is not reached, the dispute is submitted to arbitration,
3
which may assess substantial severance pay.2
Japanese recognition that employees, especially permanent as
contrasted with so-called "temporary employees," are members of the
enterprise is even more pronounced. The common expression is that
permanent employees are "members of the family," and the employment relation takes on many family attitudes. "Lifetime employment" expresses the principle that employees are members of the
enterprise and all measures possible should be taken to preserve that
relationship. If cutbacks in employment become necessary, lifetime
employees may be "dispatched" or "farmed out" to work for other
employers at their existing salaries until they are again needed and
returned to their regular jobs. 24 The plant may be completely closed
for a number of weeks, with the employees receiving eighty percent or
more of their regular pay, half of which is reimbursed by the government to employers of more than 300 employees, and two-thirds to
5
smaller employees.2
Lifetime employment is limited almost entirely to large employers; small employers are unable to provide such assurance. However,
the recognition that regular employees are members of the enterprise
with a claim to continued employment is widely shared. For example,
the practice of closing operations for a limited period and paying employees eighty percentage of their pay is more prevalent among small
employers than large employers.
Although lifetime employment is an employment practice, not a
legal concept, the Japanese courts have recognized the underlying
principle and developed rules protecting employees from dismissal. 26
22. Id. at 92-93.
23. Works Constitution Act 1972, §§ 111, 112; Weiss, supra note 21, at 167-68.
24.

KAZUO SUGENO, JAPANESE LABOR LAW 375-82 (1992).

25. Nishikawa Shunsaku & Shimado Haruo, Employment and Unemployment 1970 to 1975,
in THE LABOR MARKET IN JAPAN 124, 137-38 (Shunsaku Nishikawa ed., Ross Mouer trans.,
1980).
26. The courts have used the "abuse of rights" theory to void dismissals not based on "objectively reasonable grounds [which can] receive general social approval." SUGENO, supra note
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They will review dismissals based on lack of work and inquire into
whether the dismissals were compelled by economic necessity or
whether the employer could have borne the burden of retaining the
employees. 27 These inquiries will be made even though the employ28
ees are not lifetime employees.
It is true that lifetime employment does not fully protect so-called
temporary or part-time employees. They are used to provide much of
the flexibility needed to protect the lifetime employees. They are not
"members of the family." This, however, only reinforces the relation
between the employer and the enterprise union, for the enterprise
union does not include the temporary and part-time employees. 29 The
relation remains entirely within the "family."
When employees are treated as members of the enterprise, not
hired hands providing labor, they come to think of themselves as belonging to and having a stake in the enterprise. They develop a loyalty to the enterprise and a concern for its welfare. When they are
given full information about the financial condition of the enterprise
and a voice in its decisions, they are more ready to promote its productivity and profitability. It is this shared view of the employees'
place in the enterprise which reduces the adversarial character of
plant relations in Germany and Japan and fosters a process of mutual
problem solving and accommodation.
The fourth factor which makes the German work councils and
Japanese enterprise unions work is that when disagreements arise between management and the employees' representative, devices are
available to bring pressure on management. In Germany, a wide
range of issues are subject to "codetermination." That means that if
the works council and management are unable to agree, the dispute is
submitted to arbitration-in effect, binding interest arbitration. This
includes issues such as work schedules, overtime and short time, methods of wage payment, technical devices to monitor employees, prevention of accidents and occupational diseases, 30 guidelines for hiring,
24, at 402. If a dismissal is not for "just" cause, it is an "abuse of right," and "just" cause is
strictly applied with the courts voiding dismissals for misconduct, inefficiency, laziness, or even
theft. See T.A. HANAMI, LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN JAPAN 89 (2d ed. 1985).

27. SUGENO, supra note 24, at 407-10; Fumito Komiya, Dismissal Proceduresand Termination Benefits in Japan, 12 CoMp. LAB. L.J. 151, 156, 158-60 (1991).
28. The doctrine of "abusive dismissal," requiring that there be reasonable and objective
grounds for dismissal, has been applied to employees with contracts of indefinite duration, including "temporary workers" whose term contracts have been repeatedly renewed. SUGENO,
supra note 24, at 155-56. It also has been applied to part-time employees. Id. at 162.
29.

THE JAPAN INSTITUTE OF LABOUR, supra note 14, at 13-14.

30. Works Constitution Act 1972, § 87.
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transfers and dismissal, 31 implementation of vocational training programs, 32 and severance pay in cases of mass dismissals and plant closures. 33 Although these may not reach the "core of entrepreneurial
control," 34 the threat to carry a codetermination issue to the slow, expensive and uncertain process of arbitration provides leverage to obtain agreement on issues not subject to codetermination. Indeed,
works councils regularly negotiate for wages above the minimum prescribed by collective agreements. Although works councils are by law
prohibited from striking, the danger of unauthorized strikes cannot be
totally discounted.
Japanese enterprise unions have a variety of devices to use in disputes, designed more to embarrass than injure the employer. 35 The
strike is legally available but strikes are customarily very short 36 or
may often take the form of a protest demonstration of wearing badges
or arm bands or posting hand bills to show their dissatisfaction. 37
Such methods are often sufficient because employers take seriously
such publicity of unhappiness within the family and give weight to the
union's demands.
What conclusions might we draw from these characteristics of the
German and Japanese systems that are relevant to our search for new
forms of employee representation? The initial reaction is that the
search is a futile quest; at least, these models provide no guide. We
lack the fundamental attitudes which make these models work.
American employers generally do not accept that employees are entitled, as a matter of right, to collective representation; quite the opposite, as our experience distressingly demonstrates. Many employers
favor employee involvement programs, but these are largely limited to
communications systems or quality circle type programs which give
employees no voice in larger decisions that vitally affect their working
lives. More substantial forms of nonunion participation have been
barred by section 8(a)(2), but there is little reason to believe that its
31. Id. § 95.
32. Id. § 98.
33. Id. § 112.
34. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
35.

HANAMI,

supra 26, at 133.
OF LABOUR, supra note 14, at 43-44. More than

36. THE JAPAN INSTITUTE

two-thirds of the

strikes are less than four hours long. Yasuhiko Matsuda, Conflict Resolution in JapaneseIndustrial Relations, in CONTEMPORARY INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN JAPAN 179, 194 (Taishiro Shirai
ed., 1983).
37. SUGENO, supra note 24, at 563-68; HANAMI, supra note 26, at 137.
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repeal would lead employers generally to accept much broader shared
decision making.
Mandating works councils or employee representation committees, even if politically possible, would be accomplished over the determined opposition of employers. When defeated politically, many
employers would wage guerilla warfare in the workplace or engage in
sabotage. At the very least, they would bring to the process an adversarial attitude which would shrivel the possibilities for cooperation
and mutual problem solving. All of this points toward a voluntary
solution which would allow those employers who recognized the values of worker participation to construct a system implementing it
where there was no union. The hope would be that other employers,
seeing its values demonstrated, would come to accept it as a better
way to conduct labor relations.
Acceptance of employee participation through works councils,
however, would not of itself provide the undergirding recognition by
employers that employees are members of the enterprise, the most
important factor in leading both parties to focus on their mutual interest in the productivity and profitability of the enterprise. Employment at will and its radiations deny that workers share any rights in
their jobs and make them subservient to the whims of the employer.
And claims of management prerogatives deny that workers shall have
a voice in decisions in the workplace. Work councils can have only
limited effectiveness unless employers repudiate employment at will,
disclaim areas of management prerogatives and take other steps to
recognize employees as members of the enterprise.
Works councils are rooted in the workplace, but our unions are
also rooted in the workplace. No one seriously suggests that a new
form of representation should supplant or preclude unions; the two
forms of participation must, therefore, be coordinated. This is a more
difficult problem than in Germany where the union bargains at the
national or sectional level but has no authority in the plant. The problem here is complicated by the fact that unions seldom represent all of
the employees at the workplace, and often only a fraction in the enterprise. However, coordination, or at least coexistence, of the two systems of participation is, I believe, possible.

II.

TOWARD A NEW FORM OF REPRESENTATION

Creation by the employer of any form of employee representation, except perhaps narrowly confined "communication devices to
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promote generally the interests of quality and efficiency, ' 38 run headlong into section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act which
makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to dominate or
interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support.

' 39

Section 8(a)(2) effectively forecloses employee representation
through any structure which is not wholly independent of employer
support. For practical purposes, the alternatives are representation
through a union or no representation at all, and this leads to collective
bargaining through a majority union as the only available form of employee participation.
A common argument is that section 8(a)(2) limits employees
freedom of choice as to how they shall be represented. Many employees, it is said, want to have a voice in decisions in their workplace, but
they do not want to be represented by a union and through collective
bargaining. They perceive unions and collective bargaining as creating an adversarial relation leading to strikes. These employees, it is
argued, should be free to choose other forms of representation; and
employers who want employee participation should not be barred
from providing it where employees do not want a union.
I pass over, for the present, certain misgivings about this argument, except to say that in my view rejection of unions and collective
bargaining is less a result of employee choice than of employer
choice. Although hard data is not at hand, I doubt that many representation elections would result in a "no-union" vote if the employer
remained neutral in the election campaign. Those doubts are reinforced by experience in the public sector where employers seldom
wage vigorous anti-union campaigns and the majority seldom votes
"no-union." Certainly, employees will rarely refuse to organize where
the employer openly prefers collective bargaining.
Undoubtedly, there are many cases in which the majority of the
employees have rejected unions and collective bargaining, at least in
part, because of the employer's open opposition. This opposition may
take the form of a simple declaration, massive campaigning which
goes to the brink of illegality, or coercive unfair labor practices. In
any event, the end result is that both the employees and the employer
have rejected representation through a union, but both want some
form of employee representation for purposes of participation. It is to
38. Supra note 1.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(2).
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this situation which the present search for new forms of representations is addressed.
One path, which is commonly suggested, is to repeal section
8(a)(2) and allow employee free choice. 40 The result, however, would
not be employee free choice, but employer free choice, for the only
choice would be between the employer's proposed plan or no representation at all. Half a loaf might be better than no loaf at all, but
experience warns that many employers' plans would be little more
than crumbs.
Many, if not most, employers, are not prepared to give their employees a voice in substantial decisions of the enterprise, to give them
adequate information enabling them to make useful judgments, and to
discuss with them the potential alternatives. They may provide forms
of participation, but only so long as the employee representatives'
views do not depart from those of management and do not impede or
cast doubt on management's decisions. Whether intended or not, the
availability of such devices makes it easier for the employer to induce
employees to reject unions and collective bargaining.
Repeal of section 8(a)(2) would reopen the doors to all of the
evils it was intended to prevent. History warns that employee representation plans would be created for the very purpose of forestalling
union organization, but they would provide only the shell of representation. Their structure and functions would be determined by the employer, they would be dependent on the employer for finances and
administrative facilities, the representatives would be vulnerable to
employer pressure, and the committee could be disbanded by the employer at any time. The employees' voice would be little more than an
echo of management's.
It may be argued that employees will recognize a sham for what it
is and reject it. History does not support this argument. Formal structures of representation can disguise the lack of substance, visible procedure can create an illusion of action. Representatives who are
subservient to management, but who prize their prestige and other
benefits, will help thicken that disguise and promote the illusion. If
the employee representatives and management together control the
40. For an early, well-developed argument for this result, see Charles C. Jackson, An Alternative to Unionization and The Wholly UnorganizedShop: A Legal Basis for Sanctioning Joint
Employer-Employee Committees and Increasing Employee Free Choice, 28 SYRACUSE L. REV.
809 (1977). The author would not, in form, repeal § 8(a)(2), but would limit the inquiry to employee free choice in such a way that, by his own admission, almost any violation of § 8(a)(2)
would violate some other subsection of § 8. See id. at 838 n.119, 839 n.127.
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channels of communication, the disguise becomes nearly impenetrable
by ordinary employees. Moreover, if some employees penetrate the
disguise or become dissatisfied with the employer's plan, their only
alternative is unionization. But any movement in that direction will
risk retaliation and be met by a massive anti-union campaign orchestrated by both the employer and those who purport to represent the
employees. The choice presented will be between the union and the
employer dominated plan. Many of the employees will not see
through the disguise, and others will be persuaded that they will fare
better under a representation system which the employer strongly
supports than one which the employer bitterly opposes. The presence
of the sham plan will thereby substantially reduce union support and
employees will continue to have but the shell of representation.
The fact that some employers, out of anti-union motives, would
create sham representation plans subservient to the employer, however, should not bar those employers who want to provide employees
a meaningful voice. Employers should be able to create a representation system which has the independence, resources, information and
scope of functions needed to speak for employees on matters of substantial concern to the employees. Our search should be for a way to
permit the good while continuing to bar the bad.
In Electromation, Board Member Raudabaugh suggested that
section 8(a)(2) be reinterpreted in the light of the present legal context and industrial condition to allow some forms of employee participation plans (EPP). He would look to four factors on a case by case
basis:
(1) The extent of the employer's involvement in the structure and
operation of the committee;
(2) whether the employees, from an objective standpoint, reasonably perceive the EPP as a substitute for full collective bargaining through a traditional union;
(3) whether employees have been assured of their Section 7 right to
choose to be represented by a traditional union under a system
of full collective bargaining; and
41
(4) the employer's motives in establishing the EPP.
The four factors, on their face, are seedbeds of uncertainty; Member Raudabaugh's elaborations provide added fertility. When the
four factors are intermixed on a case by case basis they are as likely to
produce weeds as flowers, for they do not deal with the real evils of
sham representation systems.
41. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 1013 (1992) (Raudabaugh, concurring).
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If employer-initiated representation plans are to be separated
into those which are permitted and those which are barred, then the
line between the two should be reasonably clear. Employers who
seek to create the form of participation without the substance should
be clearly warned that empty shells will not do. Employers who want
to give employees a meaningful voice and create a structure for effective employee participation should know what is required to keep
within the letter and purpose of the law.
Section 8(a)(2) was enacted to reach a real evil-sham employee
representation plans which obstructed representation through unions
and collective bargaining but provided no meaningful representation
in its place. 42 That evil is as potential today as it was real when the
statute was enacted. Repeal of section 8(a)(2) or wholesale reinterpretation would open the door to the return of that evil.
The genesis of our present discussion is that section 8(a)(2)
reaches beyond the evil to prohibit all forms of non-union representation. The solution should better take the form of carving out an exception to section 8(a)(2) which would allow employers and
employees who have rejected collective bargaining to construct a system which will serve the employees' right to a voice and the employer's need for employee participation. The purpose of carving out
an exception is to make available a system of participation where employees have rejected unionization. The exception, therefore, must be
so defined as to be used only by those employers who are genuinely
ready to share decision making with their employees.
III.

THE OUTLINE OF A PROPOSAL

The core of my proposal, in simple terms, is to permit employers
to establish employee representation plans free from the strictures of
section 8(a)(2), if the plan met certain specified requirements. Those
requirements would guarantee, so far as possible, that the employees'
representatives had the independence necessary to speak freely on behalf of the employees,' that they were the voice of the employees, not
the echo of the employer. The suggested requirements, drawn largely
from the German works councils, should be cast in general terms so as
to provide flexibility. The central principles would be guaranteed independence from the employer and the guarantee of a meaningful
voice.
42. See generally Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1379 (1993).
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This alternative should not be available to an employer which has
interfered with its employee's free choice; its purpose is to provide a
form of employee representation only where employees have freely
chosen not to have a union. Therefore, an employer should not be
allowed to establish such a plan when there was an active organizing
campaign under way or a representation preceeding was pending.
Nor should an employer be allowed to establish such a plan where an
unfair labor practice proceeding against the employer was pending or
there had been a final determination of an unfair labor practice
against the employer in the preceding three years. The availability of
an alternative should not provide the employer an incentive to interfere with an employee's freedom of choice.
The requirements which an employee representation plan should
meet to be exempt from section 8(a)(2), I would suggest, include the
following:
First,although the structure would be framed at the outset by the
employer, the employees should be free to modify the structure by
majority vote after consultation with the employer, so long as the
structure is kept within the specified requirements. Once established,
the plan could be abolished or disbanded only by the employees.
Second, supervisory and administrative employees should be represented separately from non-supervisory employees in order to insulate employee representatives from management influence or control.
This should not preclude inclusion of first line foremen in the nonsupervisory employee group where both agree, but the representatives
of the non-supervisory groups must, themselves, be non-supervisory
employees. The plan should call for joint meetings of representatives
of all employee groups with representatives of management. But to
assure continued independence, the representatives of the non-supervisory employees must retain the right to meet alone with representatives of management to deal with matters of their concern.
Third, the employee representatives should be elected by those
they represent, free from outside influences. The elections should be
at reasonable intervals and the nomination and election process
should be subject to basic safeguards similar to those provided in Title
IV of the Landrum-Griffin Act 43 for election of union officers.
Most important, the choice must be that of the employees, uninfluenced by the employer. The employer should be barred from giving any support of any kind to any employee candidate, just as section
43. Labor Management and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 401.
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401(g) of Landrum-Griffin prohibits employers from promoting any
candidate for union office.
Fourth, the employee representatives must be provided the resources needed for performing their functions. This would include
paid time off for meetings with management, meetings with employees, handling of grievances, and internal discussions. The minimum
amount could be fixed, as in Germany, by the number of employees
covered. Employee representatives must also be provided office
space and secretarial support, and have the right to hold employee
meetings on company premises.
Most important, an employee representative plan must have
guaranteed financial support for various organizational and educational purposes, and for hiring professional services and experts. This
would include such costs as arbitration of grievances, enforcement of
employees' legal rights, use of experts in health and safety matters and
job evaluation programs. Again, the amount could be determined by
some prescribed formula, to be paid by the employer. The employees
should be free to supplement the amount with a check-off by majority
vote.
Fifth, employee representatives should be protected from fear of
retaliation for their activities. They should not be subject to dismissal
or discipline, except upon employer proof of just cause, and they
should not be subject to lay off so long as there was work available
which they were qualified to perform. Prohibiting discrimination does
not provide adequate protection because proving motive is too difficult. The representative should be able to enforce this right either by
suit for dismissal contrary to public policy or by arbitration for dismissal without just cause, as well as by an unfair labor practice
proceeding.
Sixth, the employer should have a duty to confer with the employee representatives on all matters which substantially affect the
employees' working lives. Because the underlying principle of employee participation is to treat employees as members of the enterprise and give them a voice, there is no reason for drawing the
troublesome and divisive line between bargainable subjects and management prerogatives. The only duty on management will be to confer; management will still retain the ultimate right to decide. The right
of employees to strike would not be enlarged or reduced, for the only
change in the National Labor Relations Act would be to provide an
exemption from section 8(a)(2).
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Employers would no doubt prefer to prescribe the subjects with
which employee representatives could deal. This, however, would enable employers to limit the subjects and create a structure of elected
representatives with no voice, a shell with no content. This is the kind
of sham which section 8(a)(2) was designed to prevent. Any attempt
to allow an employer to limit the subject matters to be discussed, but
at the same time guarantee a substantial measure of participation
would require line drawing which would generate uncertainty and
controversy. The best test of whether a matter is of substantial interest to employees is their insistence on discussing it, and if it is of substantial interest to employees, the employer will undermine the
purpose of participation if it insists that the subject is none of the employees' business.
The employer's duty should be to "confer" or "consult," not to
"bargain," if for no other reason than to avoid the image of an adversarial process. But there would be a more fundamental difference;
conferring or consulting would be a continuing process. Problems
would be discussed and resolved as they arose, not bargained as a
package and frozen for two or three year intervals. The duty on both
sides would include, of course, the duty to meet, exchange views, and
consider proposals and counter proposals for dealing with the
problems in an effort to find a mutually acceptable solution. This solution would become the governing rule or principle to be followed by
the parties until it was changed through the process of consultation.
Perhaps the most important aspect of the duty to confer would be
the duty of the employer to provide the employee representatives all
relevant information; they can not speak to a problem without all the
relevant facts. This must include information which will enable them
to make responsible judgments of the ability of the enterprise to bear
the costs or burdens of potential solutions. The employees have as
much concern as management with the continued viability of the enterprise. The scope of information required may be borrowed from
the German Works Constitution Act. This includes giving information "in full and good time" of any plans concerning the construction,
alteration or extension of the plant, works processes or jobs; matters
relating to manpower planning such as manpower needs, staff movements and vocational training; and financial matters such as the economic and financial situation of the company, the production and
investment programs, rationalization plans, introduction of new work
methods, reduction of operations, and plan transfers or closures, or
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any "other circumstances and projects that may materially effect the
interests of employees of the company." 44
Finally, the employee representatives should have the authority
and ability to aid employees in enforcing any statutory or other legal
rights, including those arising under individual contracts of employment. Where the employer and the employee representatives have
agreed upon any rules or benefits, whether stated in the form of employer policies or written agreements, these should be enforceable by
any employee for whose benefit they are made as a part of their contract of employment, and also by the employee representatives. The
plan should include a provision that disputes over rights under individual contracts of employment and under agreements between the
employer and the employee representatives should be submitted to
binding neutral arbitration.
These are the broadly stated standards which I believe an employer-created representation plan should meet to be entitled to exemption from section 8(a)(2). There remains the question of how
such a proposal would be administered and enforced. If an employercreated plan, on its face, did not fully meet these standards, its creation would be an unfair labor practice and the order should be for the
employer either to disestablish the plan or, if it met most of the standards, to amend it to meet the standards. If the plan, on its face, met
the standards, but the employer in practice violated any of them, those
violations would be unfair labor practices, leading to the usual order
to cease and desist. If those violations were extensive or persistent,
evidencing an unwillingness of the employer to observe the standards,
then the plan should be disestablished.
The existence of such employee representation plans would not
structurally change unionization or collective bargaining. Where the
union represented some, but not all, of the employees in the establishment, the employee representation plan would include only those not
covered by the union. The two forms of employee participation would
coexist. This might well create some tension because their scope and
functions would be different, but each could operate independently.
Unions would retain all of their rights under the statute to organize,
petition for elections, and to become an exclusive bargaining representative. If the majority in an appropriate unit voted for the union,
this would demonstrate those employees' choice to be represented by
44. Works Constitution Act 1972, § 106. See also, id. §§ 90, 92, 99, 100, 110, 111 (stating
other requirements of information).
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the union rather than the employer-created plan and the union would
become the statutory representative. The employer would then be
barred from dealing with the plan's representatives on issues involving
employees in the bargaining unit and would be required to bargain
with the union. This might require a new election of representatives
by those outside the bargaining unit, but the plan could continue for
those not represented by the union.
All employees would retain all of their rights under the National
Labor Relations Act, including their section 7 right to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid and protection. Any two or more employees who were dissatisfied with any of their terms and conditions
of employment could, like the employees in Washington Aluminum,45
refuse to work until their demands were met. Certainly, the employee
representatives should not be able limit or surrender that right of employees to strike as a union may do in agreeing to a no-strike clause.
A substantial question is whether employee representatives could
be barred by agreement or otherwise from calling a strike. German
works councils are, by law, prohibited from engaging in "acts of industrial warfare," but they have the leverage of being able to demand
arbitration on a number of issues. Employee representatives would
have no such leverage. Their practical ability to call a strike would be
very limited because they would have little or no resources to support
a strike. Moreover, the very nature of their establishment and operation would not look toward use of economic force as a method of
resolving differences. It seems to me that they should have available
at least this limited instrument to encourage the employer to make
serious efforts to reach mutually agreeable solutions.
An employee representation plan under this proposal has obvious weaknesses; it is not the equivalent of representation by a majority union. At the outset, it may not be the fully free choice of the
employees. In an NLRB election campaign the employer may bring
its full weight to bear to defeat the union so long as it avoids being
found guilty of an unfair labor practice. The employer's touting the
availability of an alternative plan which it prefers will add to its antiunion arguments. The election outcome will reflect the employer's
choice even more than it does now.
Policing the requirements would present substantial burdens.
Every plan could raise questions as to whether it conformed in all
respects to the requirements. These problems could be eased by rule45. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
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making and advisory opinions if the Board forced itself from the selfimposed blinders of case by case adjudication. In any case, it would,
for at least a time, add substantially to the work load of the Board.
Most important, it would be difficult to legally prevent employers
from making the process of consultation an empty shell. The danger
is that the employer would establish the formal structures, provide the
required information, meet with the employee representative, pretend
to listen, but give the employees' representative's view no weight.
Proving refusal to consult in good faith would be an even more
ephemeral pursuit than proving refusal to bargain in good faith.
There could, in reality, be no employee participation; the employee
voice would be hollow. Even with the requirements, there is a danger
that the plan would carry the seeds of company unionism.
The employees would have three potential responses to induce
the employer to listen. First,the employer would largely lose the values of increased employee cooperation and efficiency. The plan
would serve no purpose other than potentially forestalling unionization. Second, the employees could engage in concerted action. A
traditional strike would have limited potential, but short term strikes,
slow downs or even sabotage could exact a price. The employers failure to live up to the promises held out in establishing the plan could
provide an incentive for such activities. Third, the employees, on finding that the plan was a shell, could readily convert it into a union and
become the legal bargaining representative.
All of these responses provide only limited leverage to induce the
employer to listen and consult in good faith. But the threat of these
responses would exert some pressure on employers. The creation of a
representation plan which met the stated requirements would create a
level of employee expectations and provide an organizational structure which would substantially increase the likelihood and ability of
the employees to make these responses effective. This would decrease
the incentive of employers to create plans for sham purposes, but not
discourage employers who had a genuine desire to provide for employee participation.
There may be relatively few employers who, when confronted
with the possibility, will be willing to give their employees the voice
which this proposal would provide. Most employers may prefer to
limit employee involvement to suggestion boxes, communications systems or quality circles now allowed under section 8(a)(2). The propo-
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sal is designed only to meet the needs of those who want to give their
employees a meaningful voice, however few or many they may be.
CONCLUSION

This proposal is not presented as an ideal solution for providing
employees meaningful participation in the decisions which affect their
working life. In my view, collective bargaining between unions and
management could potentially provide a much better instrument. If
we had sixty or seventy percent unionization and employers fully accepted unions and collective bargaining, then Sweden, with its
Codetermination Act of 1976,46 might provide a model. But we do
not have a comprehensive system of collective bargaining; most
American employers do not accept unions; and collective bargaining
in this country has a predominate adversarial character. Providing
participation through collective bargaining is at present impossible for
the great majority of employees.
Mandated works councils built on the German model, with any
three employers able to call for the election of a works council, would
in my view, be the next best solution. Such a system could be structurally adapted to our present situation by the relatively simple device of
providing for works councils where no majority union held representation rights. This would create less problems and tensions than now
often exist when two or more unions have bargaining rights in the
same enterprise.
The proposal here to provide a structured exception to section
8(a)(2) has only two claims to serious consideration. It will provide an
alternative to the two present polar choices-representation by a majority union or no representation at all. The other virtue is that it
appears to be within the range of present possibilities. It will provide
an alternative for employers who recognize the values of employee
participation, but whose employees reject unionization, without opening wide the doors to the evils barred by section 8(a)(2).47

46. Lag om Medbestammande i arbetslivet.
47. I doubt many employers will opt for this alternative. Their reaction may be, in Professor Finkin's words, "With a works council like this, why not have a union and be done with it?"
That reaction, however, will betray many wanting to talk of employee participation but not provide it. We might then ask just how much employee participation do employers generally want,
and how much decision making are they willing to share? If employers do not want real participation, then § 8(a)(2) should remain with full vigor.

